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Abstract
The lack of a stable, fair and generally applicable sharing mechanism is one of the most noticeable impediments to the
implementation of logistics cooperation. Most of the current literature on the sharing mechanism in logistics cooperation
focuses on superadditive logistics cooperation games, neglecting the probable occurrence of other types of games resulting
from coordination cost and unequal partners. In this work, we propose a sharing model based on game theoretic solutions,
taking account of the bargaining power of players to identify a fair in-Core allocation. Under full cooperation assumption,
we generalize this model for non-superadditive logistics cooperation games with coordination costs at different levels.
The games with empty Core are also studied within the model.
Key words: Logistics cooperation, game-theoretical approach, bargaining power, non-superadditive game in logistics
1 Introduction
Today cooperation is becoming more and more crucial to improve the global performance of logistics. As
the complement of traditional vertical cooperation, a new cooperation mode, the horizontal cooperation was
proven efficient to reduce global cost and improve service rate in logistics. However, despite the advantages
and the available planning tools, horizontal cooperation is not a must-have in logistics due to barriers to
implementation. One main obstacle is the absence of appropriate sharing mechanism, which guarantees the
incentive and the stability of the cooperative relationship by fairly allocating the common gain in different
modalities of cooperation. In particular the situation is more complex when extra coordination cost (CC) is
needed to build up the cooperation, or when the bargaining power is taken into account in the allocation. To
overcome the barrier, we adopt the cooperative game theory to investigate the logistics horizontal cooperation
as cooperative games. By proposing fair and stable gain allocations to the players (the horizontal logistics
cooperators), we promote the implementability of such cooperation.
The contribution of this paper is as follows. Firstly, we identify different cooperation types of supply chains
pooling under full cooperation assumption, for example cooperation with negligible CC or significant CC, with
or without a global satisfaction solution, etc. Secondly, we investigate the gain sharing and coalition stability
issues in different types of cooperative pooling game, and then propose a set of generally applicable gain
? This paper was not presented at any other revue. Corresponding author Shenle Pan. Tel : +33 (0)1 40 51 93 12.
Email addresses: xiaozhou.xu@mines-paristech.fr (Xiaozhou Xu), shenle.pan@mines-paristech.fr (Shenle
Pan), eric.ballot@mines-paristech.fr (Eric Ballot).
IESM 2013, RABAT - MOROCCO, October 28 - October 30
sharing mechanisms that take account of the players’ bargaining power. Finally, noticing the scarcity of non-
superadditive game investigation in current logistics cooperation literatures, we generalize our sharing model to
non-superadditive pooling games to improve its general applicability.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the supply chains pooling concept, and then identify
different cooperation types and the barrier to the implementation. In Section 3, we model the supply chains
pooling as a cooperative game, examine the existing sharing rules, and then introduce the sharing mechanisms
developed in this paper. Then in Section 4, we apply this sharing mechanism in an experimental pooling case
with real world data. The conclusion of this work is drawn and some insights are highlighted in Section 5.
2 Questions raised by supply chains pooling
2.1 Supply chains pooling: a modality of horizontal cooperation in logistics
A great emphasis was put on cooperation in supply chains, but mostly between suppliers and customers,
a practice also known as vertical cooperation. Since few years another type of cooperation is studied and
experienced within supply chains: horizontal cooperation [4,5]. This form of cooperation takes place between
companies operating at the same level of market. In this paper, we will focus on a specific application of
horizontal cooperation in logistics: the supply chains pooling concept. As defined and studied by Ballot and
Fontane [3] and Pan et al. [20], the idea of pooling is the co-design of a communal logistics network for partners
(suppliers, clients, carriers, etc.) with a common objective in order to share logistics resources and to improve
the logistics performance as a whole. The motivation is the consolidation of flows on shared facilities. Figure 1
illustrates an example of pooling. In this example, all partners (suppliers 1, 2 and retailers 1, 2, 3, 4) plan their
logistics network cooperatively by sharing facilities.
WH1 
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DC1
DC2
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WH2
DC3
DC1
DC2
Before pooling After pooling
Fig. 1. Illustration of the supply chains pooling (WHi: Warehouse of suppliers i; DCj : Distribution Center of retailer j)
It has been proven in the literature that the horizontal cooperation or pooling practice can be seen as an
efficient solution to improve the freight transportation [17,16,12,10,19,20]. However, we see only few realizations
until now. The gap lying between the pooling initiative and its implementation is the lack of appropriate
cooperation model, in particular sharing mechanism for different pooling cases [4]. In following sections, we
firstly identify different pooling cases, and then examine why current sharing mechanisms are not sufficient to
support horizontal pooling.
2.2 Identification of pooling cases
In this work, we focus on the logistics cooperation organized by Logistics Service Providers (LSPs), where a
global optimum yielding highest cost efficiency is the most preferable. We broadly divide pooling cooperation
into 2 categories with respect to negligible or significant CCs arising in cooperation, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Different categories of LSP-initiated pooling
Coordination cost Cooperation categories
Negligible C1: superadditive cooperation with global op-
timum incentive
Significant C2: non-superadditive cooperation with global
optimum incentive
One of the most important criteria to distinguish pooling cases is the existence of CC (coordination cost).
Broadly it is the extra costs engaged in the cooperation, i.e. the communication cost, the investment in IT
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or in facility etc. In previous works on game-theoretic investigation of logistics cooperation, the costs of the
coordination among players for coalition formation and maintaining are always considered negligible [13,1]. We
notice that this holds in some cases, for example when the logistics cooperation occurs among the customers of
a common LSP. Since the LSP has already got the prerequisite (information, facility, etc.), for the cooperation
among his customers, the CC is negligible. Otherwise, the CC may become significant.
When CC is negligible, the coalition containing all participants (i.e. the grand coalition) will generate the highest
common gain (C1 in Table 1). But when the CC arises, the game is becoming non-superadditive. The synergy
lying in the cooperation between certain participants may be less than the CC needed to form the corresponding
cooperation relationship. In this case, a cooperation scheme based on a partition of grand coalition (cooperation
occurs only within sub-groups of participants, namely, the sub-coalitions) may be more preferable (C2 in Table
1). And the partition generating the highest global profit is called the optimal coalition structure (optimal CS).
Note that potentially the grand coalition could be optimal CS in non-superadditive game.
Most of the existent research works on logistics cooperation focus mainly on the C1 cooperation cases, where the
CC is negligible, and on the corresponding superadditive cooperation game, where the grand coalition will always
be the optimal CS [16,14,6]; but very few on non-superadditive cases [9]. Having identified different categories
of horizontal cooperation, we intend to investigate different cooperations cases from a general viewpoint, and
propose feasible game-theoretic solutions. In the following section, we investigate the sharing mechanism issue
in pooling from a game-theoretic viewpoint.
3 The sharing mechanism
3.1 Modeling of logistics pooling game and some preliminaries
We denote our supply chains pooling game by Gp = (N, v, P ). N is the set of all players in the game (potential
pooling cooperators). v is the value function of a given coalition S defined as v(S) = B(S) −M(S) − CC(S),
where B(S) =
∑
i∈S B(i), and B(i) denote the individual logistics cost of player i ∈ N ; M(S) denote the
optimized logistics cost of a coalition S after pooling; and CC(S) denote the coordination costs for pooling
arisen in the coalition S. Note that when CC(S) = 0, ∀S ⊆ N and |S| > 1, we can easily proof that the game
is superadditive since we always have B(S) ≥ M(S) and then v(S + T ) ≥ B(S) + B(T )−M(S)−M(T ) ≥ 0.
But when CC(S) > 0, ∀S that |S| > 1, the latter inequation is no longer always validated due to the presence
of CC in it. The game thus is non-superadditive. P is a given CS (recall that coalition Structure) that is a
partition of coalitions of all players N , that P = {S1, S2, ...Sk} where for all l ∈ {1, 2, ...k}, we have Sl ⊆
N,
∑k
l=1 Sl = N, (i 6= j)→ Si ∩ Sj = Ø. If P is the set of all possible partitions, for the given P ∈P, we have
v(P ) =
∑
i∈{1,...k} v(Si). Particularly P
∗ is an optimal CS that v(P ∗) ≥ v(P ) for all P ∈P. Note that we also
take {N} as a special CS. Thus specially, we have game Gp = (N, v, {N}), abbreviated by (N, v), as the game
with the grand coalition being the optimal CS. Aumann and Dreze [2] prove that a necessary condition for a
game with coalition structure (CS) being stable (i.e. having a non-empty CS Core) is that the CS formed is
the optimal one. In this sense the optimal CS is the most ”promising” CS in the cooperation, in terms of the
possibility to be stable and the total gain that can be generated. So we defined our pooling game based on the
optimal CS, noted as Gp = (N, v, P
∗).
An allocation x is a vector with elements xi that indicate the corresponding payoff for each player. We have
x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi and x(P ) =
∑
i∈P xi. A payoff vector x is called an imputation if x satisfies two criteria: the
individual rationality, i.e. xi ≥ v(i), ∀i ∈ N ; and efficiency, i.e.
∑
i∈Sk xi = v(Sk), ∀Sk ∈ P ∗. The set of all
imputations of a game G = (N, v, P ∗) is denoted by I(N, v, P ∗), and especially I(N, v) for game (N, v).
With regard to the outcome of a game, we introduce two important concepts of allocation solution: the Core
and the CS Core. The Core of a game is firstly defined by Gillies [11] for game G = (N, v):
Core(N, v) = {x|x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N, andx ∈ I(N, v)}. (1)
It contains all stable allocations, which guarantee that there is no coalition can benefit by jointly deviating from
the grand coalition. Drechsel and Kimms [7] present an algorithm to compute Core allocations, which makes
the Core concept more applicable. Aumann and Dreze [2] generalize the Core solution concept to games with
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CS, i.e. the CS Core. Similarly, given a CS, the CS Core contains all allocations that can guarantee no incentive
to deviate from this CS. The CS Core of a game G = (N, v, P ) is defined by:
CS Core(N, v, P ) = {x|x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N, , and x ∈ I(N, v, P )} (2)
The Core and CS Core are credible stability criteria that are valid in both myopic and farsighted points of view
[15]. Many authors use the Core concept to guarantee the stability of their allocation [13,8]. Similarly in this
paper, the stability examinations of different sharing rules are all based on these two concepts.
3.2 A sharing mechanism for superadditive pooling games
We start investigating the sharing mechanism in pooling cases with negligible CC (Coordination Cost), namely
superadditive game. Since in this case the grand coalition N is always the optimal CS, we study the game
G = (N, v). A sharing model, which is feasible for superadditive games with non-empty Core, will be introduced
in Section 3.2.1. For superadditive games with empty Core, we propose a variation of this model in Section
3.2.2.
3.2.1 A sharing model for superadditive pooling games with non-empty Core
We suppose that a fair sharing model in the pooling games should take into account following factors: contribu-
tion to the common profit, bargaining power that impacts the negotiation result, and stability consideration for
the long-term cooperative relationship. Since the Shapley value (SV) is based on the average marginal contribu-
tion of player, so it can be regarded as the measure of players’ contribution to the common profit. Bargaining
power should be modeled into the construction of such a fair sharing model by weight, so that with the player’s
weight increasing while that of the others unchanged, his payoff increases. Further, the allocation rule should
integrate stability consideration alongside its construction. Taking account of all these criteria, we propose the
following linear programming (LP) as a sharing model to compute a fair allocation, named contribution-and-
power weighted value (CPWV).
MIN : θ
s.t. :
xi
siwi
− xj
sjwj
≤ θ,∀ i, j ∈ N ; (3)∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S),∀S ⊂ N ; (4)∑
i∈N
xi = v(N); (5)
xi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N. (6)
xi in this LP is the CPWV payoff to the player i; si is the SV payoff of player i; wi is the factor denotes
the bargaining power of player i, e.g. player i’s total weight/volume of goods transported in this cooperative
logistics system, or its revenue, etc. However, the bargaining power of player is usually a composite factor
whose determination is decided by negotiation. This adjustment factor plays an important role in the allocation
solution according to outcome of negotiation. Since the SV in a superadditive game with no dummy player will
always be positive (dummy player having no contribution is not considered in the game), and the bargaining
power factors are positive, thus it is guaranteed that si > 0 and wi > 0. This LP can identify a payoff vector x
that minimize the maximum difference between any two players’ payoff rates defined as xi/(si · wi). The other
constraints guarantee that the solution is in the Core.
From the LP of CPWV, we can easily prove that CPWV of a game with non-empty Core satisfies following
axioms:
Axiom 1 Proportionality: if for i, j ∈ N, v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j})∀S ⊆ N and i, j /∈ S, then xi/wi = xj/wj
when {x1, ...xi, ...xj , ...xn} ∈ Core(N, v);
Axiom 2 Efficiency:
∑
i∈N xi = v(N);
Axiom 3 Individual rationality: xi ≥ v(i), ∀i ∈ N ;
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Axiom 4 Collective rationality:
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N ;
Axiom 5 Weak monotonicity: if w′i > wi, and w
′
j = wj ∀j ∈ N and j 6= i, then x′i ≥ xi;
The proportionality axiom means that if two players i, j can be replaced by each other in any coalitions
without changing the worth of the coalition, they will get payoffs proportional to their weights, provided this
payoff allocation is a Core-stable one; the efficiency axiom means that the common gain achieved by cooperation
will be shared out among all cooperators; the individual and collective rationality axioms mean that the CPWV
allocation is immune to unilateral or multilateral deviation; and the weak monotonicity axiom means that as a
player i’s weight increases while keeping those of the others unchanged, player i’s payoff will increase or stay
the same, depending on if the Core-stability can be satisfied. Using this sharing mechanism, the payoff vector
calculated satisfies the previous axioms, and takes players’ contribution and bargaining power into account, thus
is fair and reasonable for players, and can be applied to model the complicated multilateral bargaining process.
Once all players arrive at a consensus on the appropriate set of bargaining-power factors, the CPWV model can
propose a reasonable allocation.
This sharing model can be applied to C1 pooling case in Table 1, when the Core is non-empty. In such superad-
ditive pooling games, players will prefer the cooperation in the grand coalition, and the payoff vector computed
by CPWV model will be always in the Core.
3.2.2 A sharing model for superadditive pooling games with empty Core
The CPWV model studies only the superadditive logistics games with non-empty Core. But this kind of game
can also have an empty Core. For example in a game with 3 players, with value function v(1) = v(2) = v(3) =
0, v({1, 2}) = 6; v({1, 3}) = 7; v({2, 3}) = 5; v({1, 2, 3}) = 8, the Core is empty though the grand coalition is still
the optimal CS. When the cooperation organizers have incentive to achieve the global optimality in the optimal
grand coalition (i.e. C1 in Table 1), we examine an alternative to the Core solution to construct a feasible
sharing mechanism for C1 cooperation with an empty Core. Shapley and Shubik [23] introduce the weak -Core
that is defined as:
Weak –core(N, v) = {x|x(S) ≥ v(S)− |S| ∀(S ⊆ N andS 6= Ø), and x ∈ I(N, v)}. (7)
When the Core of the game is empty, with sufficiently large  value, a non-empty weak -Core can always
be found. The  value in this non-empty weak -Core can be directly interpreted as the highest individual
sacrifice/give-up that players would like to afford for achieving the cooperation in the grand coalition. Maschler
et al. [18] formally defines the weak least Core (WLC) as being the non-empty weak -Core with smallest
possible  value, noted by ∗. For games with empty Core, the WLC can be interpreted as the allocation set
that contradicts the least with Core stability. Based on the CPWV model above, we propose an alternative
solution by replacing the Core-stability constraint in the previous model by the WLC constraints. This solution
denoted by CPWV in WLC can be computed by following LP.
MIN : θ
s.t. :
xi
siwi
− xj
sjwj
≤ θ,∀ i, j ∈ N (8)∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)− |S|∗,∀S ⊂ N (9)∑
i∈N
xi = v(N). (10)
xi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N (11)
This solution is suitable for C1 pooling case with an empty Core. By using this solution, we can always find ap-
propriately compromised allocation for the players with full-cooperation preference, and this allocation satisfies
efficiency, individual rationality, weak monotonicity and the following two axioms:
Axiom 6 Modified proportionality: if for i, j ∈ N, v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j})∀S ⊆ N and i, j /∈ S, then xi/wi =
xj/wj when {x1, ...xi, ...xj , ...xn} ∈Weak LeastCore(N, v);
Axiom 7 Weak collective rationality:
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S)− |S|∗, ∀S ⊂ N .
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3.3 Generalization of CPWV in non-superadditive games
As the coordination cost (CC) arises, the pooling game is no longer superadditive and the optimal CS may
not be the grand coalition. In this case (i.e. C2 in Table 1), a sharing mechanism in a game with CS will be
needed. At first place it is important to highlight the two peculiarities of non-superadditive pooling games: the
occurrence of non-positive SVs and the determination of the optimal CS. These peculiarities should also be
taken into account in the CPWV model.
Firstly, when the pooling game is non-superadditive, for some coalitions whose synergy is lower than the CC to
pay, the value function v in game Gp = (N, v, P
∗) may be negative. And due to negative marginal contribution
to some coalitions, some players may have negative SVs, even when the grand coalition is still global optimal and
stable. In this case, the SVs computed with v defined in the original game cannot represent the real contribution
of players, and CPWV model cannot calculate reasonable payoffs.
To always generate reasonable non-negative SVs, we propose the use of the value function in the superadditive
cover of the game as the input of SV computation [2]. The superadditive cover of a cooperative game (N, v) is
denoted by (N, vˆ). The value vˆ(S), is defined by: vˆ(S) = max{∑S∈PS v(S)|PS is a partition of S}. The intuitive
meaning of superadditive cover is that when new members join a coalition, only the most beneficial cooperation
will actually occur, and the thus-formed coalition will cooperate in an optimal partition of this coalition. The SV
computed with vˆ in the superadditive cover will always be positive, provided that there is no dummy player in
the pooling game. Further, Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [21] find that their dynamic non-cooperative approach
implements the SV of the superadditive cover as an equilibrium outcome for games with CS, which is a support
for the use of superadditive cover SV in our work. Note that the superadditive cover of a superadditive game is
itself, so it is a generally feasible way to compute the SV.
Secondly, another question is to determinate the optimal CS, demoted by P ∗, in which the pooling games should
be carried out. This questions is well studied at non-superadditve games branch. And in this paper we adopt
the model developed by Rahwan and Jennings [22] to compute the optimal CS. Once the latter is decided, we
have to integrate into the CPWV model the corresponding generalizations of the SV and the Core, i.e. the CS
SV and the CS Core, which is introduced by Aumann and Dreze [2].
We adapt the CPWV to non-superadditive pooling games by integrating the CS SV (computed with superaddi-
tive cover vˆ and corresponding to the optimal CS) and the CS Core. This solution named CS CPWV is helpful
to support pooling cases as C2 in Table 1 when the CS Core is non-empty. The CS CPWV allocation can be
computed by following LP.
MIN : θ
s.t. :
xi
s′iwi
− xj
s′jwj
≤ θ, ∀ i, j ∈ Sk, ∀ (Sk ∈ P ∗ and v(Sk) > 0) (12)∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S),∀S ⊂ N (13)∑
i∈Sk
xi = v(Sk).∀Sk ∈ P ∗ (14)
xi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N (15)
In this linear program, s′i is the CS SV of player i computed by the value function of the superadditive cover vˆ
with respect to the optimal CS P ∗. To implement this allocation rule, the coalitions Sk that v(Sk) = 0 should
be excluded from this cooperation group to make sure that s′i > 0. Note that in C3 and C4 cooperations, the
optimal CS may or may not be the grand coalition. When the optimal CS is the grand coalition, the CS CPWV
model is equivalent to the CPWV model, with P ∗ = {N} and S1 = N being the only sub-coalition in P ∗.
Similarly, from the formulation of the CS CPWV, we can see that CS CPWV of a game in coalitional form with
non-empty CS Core satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, collective rationality, and weak monotone axioms.
When the CS Core is empty in the pooling cooperation of type C3, a compromise can be made by replacing
constraints (13) in previous model with following constraint set:∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)− |S|∗∗,∀S ⊂ N, (16)
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where ∗∗ is the corresponding  value in the weak least CS Core (WLCSC).
Thus we construct a set of CPWV solutions that correspond with both superadditive and non-superadditive
pooling cases, listed in Table 2. When players are interested on global profit, whenever the Core (CS Core)
Table 2
Gain-sharing solutions for different supply chains pooling cases
Coordination cost Core Solution
Pooling cases
Negligible
Non-empty CPWV
Empty CPWV in WLC
Significant
Non-empty CS CPWV
Empty CS CPWV in WLCSC
is empty/non-empty, our CPWV solutions constructed for identified feasible pooling cooperation categories
provide fair and reasonable gain-sharing solutions with general applicability. The coalition stability in different
games, the players’ contributions and the players’ bargaining powers are considered in the model.
4 Application of CPWV model to experimental pooling cases
4.1 Presentation of the case
The aim of this part is to investigate the practicability of the developed gain sharing models. To this end, a
pooling cooperation based on FMCG (Fast-Moving Consumer Goods) supply chains real data in France has
been investigated. By our partners of this research works, we are provided an original database, which contains
one-week flows of one retailer and his four suppliers in food sector, from the suppliers’ Warehouse (WH) to
eight national Distribution Centers (DC) of the retailer with knowing the location of all WHs and DCs. The
characteristics of the flows are described in Table 3.
Table 3
Characteristics of flows of the pooling case during the week studied (NS:Num of sites; SF:Sum of flows in pallet; NL:Num
of links; AF:Average flows/link; SDF: Standard deviation of flows/link; AK:Average KM/link; SDK:Standard deviation
of KM/link)
NS SF NL AFL SD AK SDK
Supplier 1 1 77 1 77 - 511 -
Supplier 2 1 714 8 89,25 32,63 519 148
Supplier 3 1 55 4 13,75 20,63 491 187
Supplier 4 1 63 2 31,5 37,48 476 71
There are four players in the game (N, v, P ∗), where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} represents the set of four suppliers. In this
pooling case, we focus mainly on the impact of different CCs on the cooperation scheme: superadditive game
when CC(S) = 0 ∀S ⊆ N and non-superadditive game when CC increases.
Recall that here we define the value of coalition S v(S) as the saving of transportation cost in S. And it is
calculated as v(S) = B(S)−M(S)−CC(S) where B(S) is the transportation cost of coalition S before pooling,
M(S) is the optimized transportation cost after pooling, and CC(S) is the coordination cost of coalition S.
In this work, the coordination cost CC(S) is defined as:
CC(S) =
{
0 if|S| < 2
cc · (|S| − 1) if|S| ≥ 2. (17)
We can further change the coefficient cc (the extra cost for adding a new player to the game) to study the
impact of CC on the optimal CS of the game.
The transportation cost of coalition S after pooling M(S) is obtained by an adapted optimization model of
Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) based on the former works concerning the pooling logistics network
design problem. For more detail refer to [19].
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4.2 Sharing schemes in the pooling game
4.2.1 Supperadditive pooling scenarios
This pooling case with real-world data will be investigated under two assumptions: with coefficient cc = 0 (C1
or C2 in Table 1) or cc > 0 (C3 or C4). At first, we investigate the pooling games with cc = 0.
When cc = 0, this game is superadditive, and has a non-empty Core, thus the grand coalition will be stable. By
cooperating in the grand coalition, 15.9% logistics cost saving (6313 Euros for one week) can be achieved. Then
we consider how to divide the common gain. We simply adopt an arbitrary bargaining power vector {1, 2, 1, 3}
to compute the CPWV allocation in this game, and compare it with the SV allocation. These two allocations are
illustrated in Figure 2.We can see that our sharing mechanism further adjusts the gain allocation according to
different bargaining powers, for example the payoff of S3 with power weighted 1 has clearly decreased, in contrast
to that of S4 with power weighted 3. While the payoff vector will be changed by modifying the bargaining power
vector, the Core stability of the allocation is always guaranteed.
1
2
1
3
265.
2825.17
2130.17
1092.67
147.741
3150.14
1187.6
1827.53
Bargaining power weights
S1 S2 S3 S4
SVs
S1 S2 S3 S4
CPWV allocations
S1 S2 S3 S4
Fig. 2. Comparison of allocations in the pooling case with null CC
4.2.2 Non-supperadditive pooling scenarios
As cc increases, coalitions’ profits decrease, and the player whose logistics network is of least synergy potential
will leave the grand coalition the first. Only coalition with high synergy may survive. And at the end, when cc
increases to a certain level that makes none of the players feels profitable to cooperate, the optimal CS will be
singletons. In our pooling game, when cc ≥ 530, the grand coalition is no longer stable, and when cc > 3929,
players tend to singletons. Figure 3 shows how the optimal CS changes as the coefficient cc increases. The
vertical axe denotes the scale of the largest coalition in the optimal CS.
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Fig. 3. Optimal coalition structure submitted to different coordination cost
And as we discussed in Section 3.3, we demonstrate in this non-superadditive scenario of pooling the occurrence
of negative SVs , presented in Figure 4. We illustrated the (CS) SV allocations when cc increase by 100 from 0
to 4200. We can see that in the game with cc = 500, where the grand coalition is the optimal CS and the Core
is non-empty, player 1’s SV is negative. And so does the game with cc = 1800 where player 2 has a negative SV.
In these cases, another allocation rule is necessary to achieve globally optimal solution. Hence the CS CPWV
model in Section 3 based on supperadditive cover concept is employed.
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Fig. 4. Player SVs/CS SVs as coordination cost increases
We computed different SV allocations of the superadditive cover when cc increases and the corresponding CPWV
allocations with bargaining power weight vector w = {1, 2, 1, 3}. The two sharing schemes are illustrated in
Figure 5.
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(a) The SV/CS SV allocations of players
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(b) The CPWV/CS CPWV allocations of
players
Fig. 5. Comparison of players’ SV and CPWV allocations in the pooling game computed by superadditive cover value
function vˆ
There is an apparent difference between the two sharing schemes. With the integration of players’ bargaining
power and game-theoretic solutions, the CPWV sharing model can propose theoretical feasible solutions and
captures more factors that is important for real-world cooperation implementation at the same time.
There are three remarks for Figure 5. Firstly, there is no more negative SV in all scenarios due to superadditive
cover. Secondly, overall the SVs before or after superadditive cover has not significantly changed, comparing to
Figure 4. However, the payoff to player 3 is very different from SV to CPWV, but less obvious for the other
players. Thirdly, in a coalition having only two players, for instance in the sub coalition {2,3} when cc = 1854,
the CPWV model allocates to player 2 and 3 payoffs according to their power, while in SV allocation they
equally share the gain. Overall, the allocation solution computed by CS CPWV model is more appropriate for
non-superadditive pooling cases.
As an example, we investigate the case with cc = 1500, which corresponds to the C3 pooling case in Table 1. In
this case, the game has an optimal CS P ∗ = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}} and a non-empty CS Core. The supplier 1 in this
game stays in singleton state due to low synergy, and suppliers 2, 3, 4 cooperate. Figure 6 shows the comparison
between the SV allocation of the superadditive cover and the CS CPWV allocation.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of allocations in the pooling case with cc = 1500
In this case, the SV allocates to suppliers 2, 3 the payoffs at almost the same level, while the CS CPWV
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allocation makes distinction between payoffs according to both the contribution and the bargaining power. And
in addition, in a game with non-empty (CS) Core, CPWV solution will always propose Core-stable allocations.
5 Conclusion
One of the main impediments lying in the implementation of logistics pooling is the lack of a fair and generally
applicable sharing mechanism. In this paper, we identify different cooperation types corresponding to actual
supply chains pooling cases. We propose the CPWV sharing mechanisms and its variations and generalizations
adapted for different cooperation types. This solution set can construct fair and stable allocations by considering
at the same time the Core stability, the contribution, and the bargaining power for both superadditive and non-
superadditive games.
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